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DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE
MICHAEL MCKEE*
Is the Glass Half Empty, is the
Glass Half Full? Compensable
Damages and the Contingent
Valuation Method
ABSTRACT
Should CVM values be utilized to determine an award of mon-
etary damages for injuries to a public natural resource? Cummings
and Harrison's general theme is that the values obtained from
CVM and indirect method studies (such as HPM) are sufficiently
inaccurate as to be deemed unacceptable in determining com-
pensable damages. Our theme is one of tempered optimism not pes-
simism. More is understood about the process of assigning monetary
values than when Robert Davis conducted his pioneering research
and we have a better comprehension of the accuracy and the lim-
its of this information. We argue that CVM values provide mean-
ingful results and should be used to determine compensable damages.
The courts frequently employ value estimates that have consider-
able variance and have developed the means of dealing with this;
the courts will do the same with CVM values.
INTRODUCTION
The economics literature is replete with arguments that signif-
icant problems exist in efforts to determine the monetary value of pub-
lic goods. These concerns are characterized as problems in designing
and implementing mechanisms that would accurately reveal individ-
ual preferences. Research that forms the foundation of recent efforts to
value public goods or nonmarket goods is found in works by Davis1
and Randall et al.2 It is interesting that the debate has once again re-
turned to the Natural Resources Journal which published the Robert
Davis paper acknowledged by many to be the "first" contingent valu-
* David S. Brookshire, Professor of Economics, Michael McKee, Associate Professor
of Economics, University of New Mexico. We wish to thank Don Coursey Phil Ganderton,
Ronald Cummings, John Loomis, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and the Editorial Staff of NRJ for
comments on earlier drafts.
1. R. Davis, Recreation Planning as an Economic Problem, 3 Nat. Res. J. 239 (1963).
2. A. Randall et al., Bidding Gaines for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements,
1 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 132 (1974).
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ation paper. Even in the early research efforts one can find discussion
of many of the issues that are being debated today. As such, nonmar-
ket valuation methods and results have been scrutinized from the early
stages of development. A careful reading of the literature on the con-
tingent valuation method would reveal that the earliest studies devoted
considerable effort to addressing accuracy issues. No doubt these ef-
forts occurred because it was recognized that determining individual
values for nonmarket goods is a complex problem, as is determining
individual values of market goods. The research process to date, while
not complete, has yielded a better understanding of the robustness of
methods of obtaining individual values for nonmarket goods.
The debate over the accuracy and appropriateness of contin-
gent valuation method (CVM) has recently been heightened by two
events; the Valdez oil spill and the Ohio case.3 Suddenly, the dollars
seem more real. One, however, should not forget that the dollars have
been real for some time. Nonmarket valuation in varying forms has
been utilized extensively in policy decisions and these decisions have
involved the allocation of real dollars.4 The difference at this point in
time would appear to be that real dollars are potentially being required
from specific entities, such as private corporations. In principle, there
is little fundamental difference between the use of nonmarket values
in regulatory programs or in legal settings; both affect the allocation
of resources in the economy. However, at issue in this collection of pa-
pers is the appropriateness of CVM values for a new type of use: the
determination of compensable damages. We feel that a broader ques-
tion is appropriate. That is, should CVM values be utilized in settings
where the outcome is the transfer of real dollars from one economic
agent to another? These transfers arise as outcomes of government pol-
icy as well as court imposed settlement. As such, our discussion will
view CVM from a more general framework: does enough evidence exist
to suggest the information generated by CVM has value in a decision
making process?
Our overall theme, based on the research to date, is one of tem-
pered optimism not pessimism. We now understand more about the
process of assigning monetary values than when Davis conducted his
pioneering research on the value of hunting in Maine. We have a bet-
3. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F2d 432, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
4. The USEPA has used the contingent valuation method as a tool to examine various
regulatory frameworks. Arguably these efforts have had the effect of reallocating dollars
in the economy.
In a recent special section of Water Resources Research, various authors trace
the history of the use of nonmarket valuation. See, e.g., J. Loomis, The Evolution of a More
Rigorous Approach to Benefit Transfer: Benefit Function Transfer, 28 Water Resources Res.
701 (1992); D. Brookshire & H. Neill, Benefit Transfers: Conceptual and Empirical Issues, 28
Water Resources Res. 651 (1992).
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ter comprehension of the accuracy and the limits of the information
and argue that CVM obtained values provide meaningful results, and
therefore, they can and should be used to determine compensable dam-
ages absent better information. The courts frequently are called upon
to employ value estimates that have considerable variance and have
developed means of dealing with such variance; the courts can do the
same with CVM values.5
We first address the judicial process, since a key issue is whether
the judicial process can utilize information that is less than perfect. We
argue that the process has demonstrated that it is capable of dealing
with such information. Next we address some of our points of dis-
agreement with Cummings and Harrison's interpretation of the liter-
ature. We discuss the role of laboratory institutions in the assessment
of CVM, and present some issues regarding parallelism and external
validity. We consider CVM in light of the quality of market-generated
information followed by consideration of issues associated with the value
of information. We are optimistic about the progress to date and do not
find substantive reasons why CVM values should not be used for as-
signing compensable damages. We view the glass that represents the
use of CVM values for determining compensable damages as being half
full, not half empty.
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: MEASURING DAMAGES
Environmental damage cases fall into the domain of the branch
of law known as torts. Central to the tort system is the payment of dam-
ages by the tortfeasor.6 The role of damages is two-fold: 1) compensate
the victim for the loss suffered; and 2) serve as an incentive for the tort-
feasor to take cost-justified care to avoid damages. The deterrence role
is best captured by the argument put forth by Judge Learned Hand
which may be stated as the so-called "Hand Rule" .7 Denoting the prob-
ability of the loss, L, occurring as P, the magnitude of the loss as V, and
the avoidance cost as AC yields the rule:
5. The essence of the legal proceedings in the U.S. is the adversarial process. In many
cases, the courts must deal with "expert testimony" in which the true answer must be
demonstrated by weighing competing arguments (evidence) that speaks to the same
issue.
6. The choice of rule for determining fault (negligence, strict liability (res ipsa loquitur),
or strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence) is outside the domain of this
paper. S. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Comparative Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980)
has discussed several arguments in favor of different rules based on transactions cost
arguments. For the types of damages we are considering here-oil spills, toxic waste sites,
and the like-issues of contributory negligence on the part of the victims are probably
moot.
7. R. Posner, Tort Law: Cases and Economic Analysis (1982).
Winter 19941
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if P(L)*V(L) > AC, then the agent causing the accident
is deemed to be negligent for not having taken cost-
justified avoidance actions.
Requiring the tortfeasor to pay damages for the harm caused provides
an incentive to take care, to avoid inflicting harm, to the point where
the cost of care is equal to the expected cost of the damages that re-
sult. From the perspective of economic efficiency, this is the optimal
level of care. When the damages are valued in conventional markets
the calculation of the appropriate compensable damages is relatively
straightforward. 8 When the damages involve nonmarket goods, such
as loss of life or environmental damages, the calculation of the mone-
tary damages is considerably more complex.9
The courts must wrestle with many problems involving com-
pensable damages. 10 For our present purposes, the most significant
problem is assigning values to nonmarket goods, such as the loss of
clean air or sites of national importance which have been fouled by an
oil spill. In the Ohio case the court appeared to grapple with this issue
and noted "the risk of overestimation has not been shown to produce
such egregious results as to justify judicial overruling of DOI's careful
estimate of the calibre and worth of CV methodology."11
8. Note, however, that the calculation is not independent of the overall institutional
framework.
9. In the case of computing damages to provide compensation there exists a whole
branch of law, remedies, where the focus is the determination of damages. It is not the
purpose of this paper to delve deeply into the jurisprudence associated with this field.
We will refer to this field as necessary in making our arguments concerning the
appropriateness of utilizing the values generated by the CVM in determining compensable
damages for environmental damages.
10. The courts have dealt with other non-market valuation problems such as value
of life where the courts rely on expert witnesses and the adversarial process to weight
the evidence of expert witnesses. A point which we develop later is that the courts findings
are not monolithic. This does not invalidate the process.
Elsewhere, Cummings has argued that the courts' use of economic paradigms
can be flawed. R. Cummings, Legal and Administrative Uses of Economic Paradigms: A Critique,
31 Nat. Res. J. 463 (1991). Cummings discusses two case studies. In one of the situations
discussed, the 'perfectly competitive markets model' was used to determine 'just
compensation'. Economists have long recognized the limitations of this paradigm and
have constructed models incorporating transactions costs (including the costs associated
with immobility), imperfect information, and other forms of non-competitive behavior.
Thus, the problem was not with the paradigm per se but the sole use of the paradigm.
In the Fort Berthod reservation example cited by Cummings, the problem is that the
experts failed to include nonmarket effects. What was needed was in fact some type of
nonmarket analysis that would capture more than just the market component of 'just
compensation'. Thus, we would argue that whatever information was available in these
regards at the time should have been used. We point this out because to do otherwise
would in fact be the same as not allowing the use of nonmarket values for the determination
of compensable damages.
11. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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The general principle regarding the contribution of economic
analysis to the measurement of nonmarket losses is well stated by
Cooter and Ulen:
It is painful for us to admit, but there are some contro-
versial problems in tort law, like this one of computing
intangible losses, that economics cannot solve. Still, let
us not throw up our hands in complete despair: eco-
nomics can suggest techniques of measurement that are
accurate at least to a reasonable level of approximation,
even for intangible damages, like the parents' loss from
their child's wrongful death. 12
The judicial process is an adversarial one in which all sides are
permitted to present their cases and be cross-examined on the infor-
mation presented. In this manner, the judge and/or jury can make an
evaluation based on the information and cross examination. Thus, nei-
ther the judge nor the jury need be highly qualified in the area of the
direct testimony; the adversarial process ensures that positions are chal-
lenged and defended such that lay persons are capable of evaluating
the relative merits of each side. It would appear that there are suffi-
cient checks, balances and recognition of the potential limitations to
suggest that one should be positive about the use of the information.
CUMMINGS AND HARRISON'S CRITICISM OF THE CVM-
BEHAVIORAL ISSUES
A. Overview
The spirit of Cummings and Harrison 13 (C&H) is that we should
be pessimistic regarding the use of CVM elicited nonmarket values in
the computation of compensable damages arising from man-made en-
vironmental disasters, when private entities will be held responsible.
14
They describe the problems with CVM as being due, in part, to the fail-
ure of respondents to accurately formulate their preferences and, in
12. R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 331 (1998).
13. R. Cummings & G. Harrison, Was the Ohio court Well Informed in Its Assessment of
the Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method, 34 Nat. Res. 1. 1 (1994).
14. The C&H paper can be viewed in two ways. One could argue that their concerns
with the extant literature are sufficiently great by virtue of their focus on individual
papers that nonmarket valuation techniques are inappropriate for use in the assignment
of monetary values for compensable damages. Or, alternatively, one can view their
argument as being one of addressing certain conventional wisdom as to the lack of accuracy
problems in the application of CVM. Regardless of their intent, their approach is to directly
challenge the literature and raise questions as to the appropriateness of CVM for the
assignment of compensable damages. The nature of their challenge must be regarded as
one suggesting that CVM does not provide meaningful results.
Winter 19941
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part, to strategic behavior on the part of the respondents. 15 The com-
bined effects result in reported values which are not representative of
real economic commitment as we find in conventional market settings.
They argue that evidence gleaned from experimental settings regard-
ing strategic behavior does not provide an appropriate comparison,
and they question whether individuals research their preferences ab-
sent a real economic commitment in the outcome. Since we take issue
with C&H's general position we will devote only a few paragraphs to
detailed discussion of their specific arguments.
B. Strategic Behavior
There are two types of strategic behavior which may poten-
tially compromise the usefulness of CVM to obtain compensable dam-
age measures. The first is the classic free riding behavior whereby
individuals attempt to obtain the benefits of a public good without
paying. The outcome of such behavior is an underestimate of the value.
The second, is the attempt to influence the outcome in favor of having
the good provided because the individual does not feel that he or she
will ultimately have to pay the stated amount. This behavior leads to
an overestimate of values. 16
C&H argue that conventional wisdom suggests that strategic
behavior is pervasive. 17 As evidence they consider some existing CVM
studies and some of the experimental literature. 18 C&H build their ar-
guments, in part, on a reinterpretation of these studies. We disagree
15. CVM researchers have characterized these problems as value formation and value
elicitation and many have taken considerable care to construct their surveys to minimize
these problems. The process can be multi-dimensional including the use of focus groups,
pre-testing and possible reliance on laboratory results.
16. We feel compelled to point out that this second type of strategic behavior will
result in under-as well as over-bidding since a properly constructed sample will include
respondents who prefer the provision level to be large and respondents who prefer the
provision level to be small. We are not suggesting that they cancel but only point out
there will be the influence of the two behaviors in the data.
17. We emphasize tone in that C & H's approach is to consider individual studies
one by one. In doing so, they challenge the assumptions and interpretations of results
of the authors. Thus, it would appear they are quarreling with more than the conventional
wisdom in that the studies considered by C & H do not claim to reach all encompassing
results as to the existence or lack of existence of strategic behavior. They, in fact, draw
conclusions within the framework of the individual study setting.
18. C&H cite Paul Samuelson's criticism of survey responses as being meaningless
due to the fact that they embodied no economic commitment. Cummings & Harrison,
supra note 13, at 5 (citing P. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 3 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 386 (1954)). We point out that this comment was made in 1954. Since then there
has been considerable economic research which suggests that Samuelson's pessimism
was overstated. R. Cummings, et al., Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of
the Contingent Valuation Method (1986), suggest that Samuelson recanted a bit later see
P. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 Rev. Econ. Stat. 332 (1958). Further,
a great deal of laboratory work suggests that free riding is not as pervasive as Samuelson
stated it would be.
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with their method of analysis and with their reinterpretation. 19 Our
reading of the literature is that, while CVM might not be entirely free
of strategic behavior, there is considerable evidence that strategic be-
havior is not as widespread as many early economists thought. Fur-
ther, we know of no studies that suggest that strategic behavior is so
dominant as to completely invalidate CVM.
The experimental literature in economics, psychology, and po-
litical science is often cited as providing evidence that free riding is not
pervasive even in institutions in which the dominant strategy is to con-
tribute zero.20 In the laboratory sessions conducted by Isaac, McCue,
and Plott,21 no subject consistently posted a zero contribution-even
after posting zero in an earlier stage. Further, while total contributions
were below the efficient level, they never declined to zero as predicted
by the theory. As other social scientists have argued, rational societies
do not evolve institutions which are characterized by dominant strat-
egy equilibria which are not Pareto optimal. 22 Thus, individuals will
not play strategies consistent with prisoner's dilemma settings even
when forced, by experimental design, into such settings. Since we live
19. C&H analyze the study R. Rowe et al., An Experiment on the Economic Value of
Visibility, 7 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 1 (1980) which attempted to measure the extent of
strategic bias in CVM survey responses. Respondents self-labeled themselves according
to their degree of "environmentalism" and RDB used this information to check whether
such attitudes had an effect on the WTP reported by the respondents. RDB report that
the correlation between attitudes and bids is zero, indicating a lack of strategic bias. It
would appear that C&H misinterpreted the study in that a separate dummy was included
for each class of (self-reported) environmental stance and in all cases the coefficient was
zero. On the strength of this observation, and for the setting of this survey, strategic bias
would appear to be absent as tested for in the study.
D. Brookshire et al., The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J. Envtl. Econ. &
Mgmt. 325 (1976) reports on the results of a CVM study designed to, in part, test the
problem of free-riding in CVM surveys. C & H criticize a central assumption regarding
the information the respondents were required to infer in order for the test to be applied.
We think that they erred in the inference they draw regarding the conjectures required
of the respondents. It is not true that only the last person is capable of inferring the mean
bids of the other respondents. All respondents were, in effect, responding simultaneously
to the survey. By introspection each person would infer bids posted by the others. In the
jargon of game theory, this setting requires the respondents to make conjectures regarding
the behavior of the other agents. Essentially then, C & H offer the conclusion, based
solely on their discomfort with underlying behavioral assumptions, that the BIS study
does not "provide a basis for unequivocal conclusions regarding ... Ifree-riding] ...
behavior." Cummings & Harrison. supra note 13, at 23. Of course, Brookshire, et al., supra
never made such an assertion.
20. Nor, we would note that the literature ever unambiguously argues that free riding
is not prevalent to some degree. There are few absolutes, and this especially applies in
the case of free riding.
21. M. Isaac et al., Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment, 26 J. Pub.
Econ. 51 (1985).
22. R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); M. Taylor, The Possibility of
Cooperation (1987).
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in more cooperative settings, it is not in our nature to free ride to ex-
tremes.2
3
C&H imply that laboratory results addressing strategic be-
havior are suspect because of the divergence of the reported results
across the various studies they cite. There is a good reason for this. The
incentives faced by the subjects are different across these studies by
virtue of the different institutional settings established in each of the
laboratory investigations. In the Isaac, McCue and Plott study the sub-
jects were offered a clear private incentive to free ride. It is difficult to
identify the incentives in Harrison and Hirshleifer.24 In the voluntary
contribution mechanism of Isaac and Walker, subjects' incentives to
free ride depended on their conjectures regarding the behavior of oth-
ers in the group. The most interesting fact gleaned from the experi-
mental literature is that, even when the dominant strategy for individual
subjects is to contribute zero toward the public good, we do not ob-
serve widespread free riding. As we noted above, this literature sug-
gests that free riding is not pervasive, as early economists would have
us believe. To restate, individuals will not play strategies consistent
with prisoner's dilemma settings even when forced into such settings.
In developing the "revelation principle", Myerson argued that,
if it is costless to tell the truth (as in no return to lying), then individ-
uals will do so.25 In the case of CVM, the very characteristic that C&H
criticize (hypothetical markets) is what would allow one to invoke this
revelation principle to argue that bids obtained via CVM represent true
preferences.
To conclude, we find nothing in C&H's interpretation of the
literature regarding the prevalence of strategic behavior that would
lead us to reject the use of CVM to derive measures of compensable
damages. Since this is ultimately an empirical question, what is really
needed at this juncture is a study which systematically investigates the
nature of strategic behavior in CVM.
C. Preference Research
C&H argue that the CVM setting is "purely hypothetical" and,
as such, the respondents have little incentive to actually think about
the values they reveal for the good being valued by the CVM study.
The result is that the values obtained with CVM questionnaires will
show considerable variance over time. There are two behavioral issues
23. James Andreoni has developed a theory that people donate to charities because
they "feel good" about doing so. See J. Andreoni, Giving With Impure Altruism: Applications
to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 1447 (1989).
24. The experimental design failed to implement Hirshleifer's theory. The subjects
were given incomplete information concerning the payoffs of their "partners" despite
the theoretical requirement for complete information.
25. In his text David Kreps provides a compact discussion of Myerson's revelation
principle. See D. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (1990).
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being raised here. The first is whether respondents view the CVM set-
ting as purely hypothetical. The second is whether they investigate their
preferences absent the requirement that they be in a position to im-
mediately pay for the good. We will return to this point later, but for
now we simply note that there is a great deal of literature suggesting
that individuals do research their preferences even when transactions
are not imminent.
In conventional markets is there any reason to believe that pref-
erences are stable over time? Theory would suggest that preferences
will not be stable over time as new information is made available. As
such, changing values over time is in of itself not sufficient to reject
CVM.
The issue of the effect of hypothetical settings has been addressed
in several laboratory experimental studies which have placed subjects
in the position of making decisions in environments in which the pay-
offs were purely hypothetical. The general finding is that the results
are very similar to those obtained in settings where the payoffs are real.
In fact, the only consistent result is that bids in hypothetical settings
have higher variances than those in settings which use monetary pay-
offs. 2 6 The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky reported experi-
mental results which contradicted the predictions of economic theory
concerning decisionmaking under uncertainty. Yet, when economists
have conducted similar experiments with (sometimes substantial) mon-
etary payoffs, these contradictions have persisted.27 The weight of the
evidence from empirical investigations is that the behavior is similar,
whether or not the subjects are paid directly for their decisions. 28
C&H imply that individuals do not have a real economic com-
mitment unless the individuals participating in the experiment or re-
sponding to the CVM survey actually have to put up their "own" money.
The conventional experimental setting involves paying the subjects on
the basis of the decisions they make. This is a real economic commit-
ment that falls squarely within the economist's concept of opportunity
cost; costs are foregone opportunities. A pointed illustration whereby
behavior is affected by such foregone opportunities is provided by the
26. See V. Smith & J. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics,
Econ. Inquiry; Seigel, Decision Making and Learning Under Varying Conditions of Reinforcement,
89 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 766 (1961).
27. D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 Econometrica 263 (1979); D. Grether & C. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 623 (1979); S. Kachlemeir & M. Shehata, Examining
Risk Preferences Under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's
Republic of China, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 1120 (1992).
28. There is a considerable literature on the topic discussed in this paragraph. Some
examples are: J. Irwin et al., Hypothetical and Real Consequences in Experimental Auctions
for Insurance Against Low-Probability Risks, 5 J. Behavioral Decision Making 107 (1992);
V. Smith & J.Walker, Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs, Econ. Inquiry (forthcoming
1994).
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work of Kachelmeir and Shehata who conducted experiments in China
with payoffs of up to three months' earnings. They found that behav-
ioral anomalies persisted that were observed in experiments with much
smaller cash payoffs.29
Another dimension of preference considerations is the stabil-
ity of preferences over time. However, simply observing different bids
across time is not inconsistent with CVM yielding reliable values. Econ-
omists frequently dismiss the question of tastes as being outside their
domain. An exception is the work of Stigler and Becker"' and West and
McKee.31 Stigler and Becker postulated that consumers are engaged
in the production of consumption commodities from market goods and
their own time. Thus, one does not "consume" compact discs; one con-
sumes "music enjoyment", which is produced with compact disks, a
compact disk player and the individual's time input. The productiv-
ity of the time input and the choice of mix of market good inputs will
vary as the individual acquires skills and information. Thus, one may
initially produce music enjoyment with a modest stereo system. Over
time, continued enjoyment of music leads to an increase in the indi-
vidual's skill level and which leads to further expenditure on the mar-
ket inputs (compact disks and stereo equipment). That is, the individual
responds by increasing expenditures on the market goods used to pro-
duce music enjoyment. So, we observe an increase in demand for these
goods. Although this would appear as increased WTP (and market prices
being bid up if the supply is not responsive), we would not argue that
this implies that market prices are unreliable or that tastes are unsta-
ble.
This same argument extends to environmental goods. As more
information concerning environmental issues becomes available, the
willingness to pay for environmental amenities will change. Increases
in knowledge are generated by experience and by information that is
provided by others. Thus, if information available to consumers changes
over time - and over a long time span we would certainly expect such
changes-then the demand will change and we should expect to observe
differences in WTP.32 The direction of the change is an empirical ques-
tion.
The effect of information on stated WTP values may be inferred
from studies which have given respondents "time to think". There are
not many such studies and the results are mixed. Kealy et a133 report
29. See Kachlemeir & Sehata, supra note 27.
30. G. Stigler & G. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 76
(1977).
31. E. West & M.McKee, De Gustibus Est Disputandum: The Phenomenon of Merit Wants,
73 Am. Econ. Rev. 1110 (1983).
32. With this argument we are clearly questioning the appropriateness of the time-
consistency argument that has appeared in the literature.
33. M. Kealy et al., Reliability and Predictive Validity of Contingent Values: Does the Nature
of the Good Matter?, 19 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 205 (1990).
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that the overwhelming majority of their respondents did not revise their
bids over a two-week period. This behavior was identical for both the
public and the private good. This result is consistent with the small
changes in information which we should expect to occur given the brief
time frame for updating information. However, Whittington et a134 find
that giving subjects more time to think, which might be viewed as more
information, leads to a downward revision of bids. There is simply not
enough evidence to draw an unambiguous conclusion at this time.
It is clear that we should not reject use of CVM on the grounds
that preferences are not consistent over time. This observation is true
of market goods as well, as shown by the proliferation of fads and fash-
ions. In fact, we should be suspicious of values that are static over time,
because this might suggest that consumers are blissfully ignorant of
the information being provided daily through various media.35
LABORATORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONTINGENT
VALUATION INSTITUTION
C&H raise questions as to the appropriateness of utilizing lab-
oratory experimental settings and associated results to draw inferences
concerning CVM. Their approach is to compare the institutional char-
acteristics of the laboratory settings and field settings. As Smith 36
demonstrated, microeconomic systems have a basic structure consist-
ing of environments (the agents, their tastes and endowments, and the
production technology) and institutions (the messages agents may send,
the property rights to be enforced, and the market adjustment process).
The effect of varying institutions is an empirical question and requires
systematic investigations. We disagree with the C&H characterization
of the Smith auction and the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM).
Our reading of the basic setting of both the Smith auction and the VCM
is:
1. Subjects have private wealth37 which they receive when they ar-
rive at the laboratory;
2. The subjects must choose to allocate their wealth either to the pri-
vate good with a certain return or to the public good where the
return is dependent on the behavior of the others in the group.
34. D. Whittington et al., Giving Respondents Time to Think in Contingent Valuation
Studies: A Developing Country Application, 22 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 205 (1992).
35. Historically, uses of values such as unit day values as put forth by the U.S. Forest
Service did just this.
36. U. Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 923
(1982).
37. This is not a loan as C&H describe it. This is the subject's initial wealth and is
not to be repaid at some point in the future. The subject may choose to keep this money
or to invest it in the laboratory market.
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These institutions differ in the provision rule for the public good.
Under the Smith auction, the good is provided if the costs are covered
by the total contributions and the members of the group unanimously
agree to the distribution of the burden of providing the good. No one
has seriously suggested that the strict version of the Smith auction be
applied as the provision rule in a CVM survey instrument.38 There-
fore, it is inappropriate to compare the institution presented to the sub-
jects in the Smith auction with that in CVM. Recognizing this point,
several researchers have investigated the properties of the Smith auc-
tion modified in various ways to make it tractable for field applica-
tions. Thus, a more appropriate question is: how do these modified
Smith auction mechanisms compare to CVM, and how do the results
compare to the stricter versions of the Smith Auction?39 As such, an
appropriate test would compare the results of a basic institution along
a "gradient" of changes in the characteristics of the institution. This is
based upon our notion that the provision rule embodied in the modi-
fied Smith auction 40 is a candidate for use in a CVM survey question-
naire.
Under the VCM, the good is provided continuously as contri-
butions increase. The production function of the good is such that, be-
yond a given level of total contributions, all members would benefit
from devoting their entire private wealth to the provision of the pub-
lic good. This mechanism has been found to yield fairly high levels of
voluntary provision even when group sizes are quite large.41 This pub-
lic good production function that underlies this mechanism is consis-
tent with the provision of many public goods. Thus, the provision rule
embodied in the VCM is also a candidate for use in a CVM survey
questionnaire.
An emerging strand of literature not included by C&H con-
cerns public goods provided under a threshold provision rule. That is,
38. No one has suggested using the Clarke tax, see E. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of
Public Goods, 11 Pub. Choice 17 (1971), to finance national defense.
39. There are several variants of the Smith auction that have been applied in the
literature. See D. Coursey & V. Smith, Experimental Tests of an Allocation Mechanism for
Private, Public of Externality Goods, 86 Scandinavian J. Econ. 468 (1984); J. Banks et al.,
An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms, 55 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 301 (1988); D. Brookshire et al., Special Interest and the Voluntary Provision of Public
Goods (1992) (unpublished manuscript). As a research strategy, these researchers have
taken the approach of modifying the Smith auction in the laboratory to the end of
designing a mechanism that is feasible to employ in field surveys. That is, they have
investigated the robustness of the institution to changes in some of the underlying
assumptions of Smith's original experimental investigations. The motivation for this
program of research is clear-the Smith auction in its pure form is not amenable to field
applications with even moderately sized groups.
40. D. Brookshire & D. Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical
Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 554 (1987).
41. M. Isaac & J. Walker, Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary
Provision Mechanism, 103 Q.J. Econ. 179 (1988).
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goods which will be provided only if the aggregate contributions are
sufficient to cover the cost of provision. This contribution game insti-
tution is similar to the Smith auction but does not require the ex post
unanimity condition. The contribution game has been shown to be ro-
bust in the type of one-shot setting that characterizes CVM surveys.42
The provision rule embodied in the contribution game is a candidate
for use in a CVM survey questionnaire.
Now, let us review the task facing the respondents in a CVM
survey and compare these tasks with those of the public good provi-
sion mechanisms discussed above. In a CVM survey the respondents
are asked:
1. To place themselves in the context of bidding to have a
public good supplied in a market setting which might po-
tentially arise;
2. To state how much of their private wealth they would
wish to give to the provision of the public good contin-
gent on the good being made available. The elements of
the contingent market are:
a. The public good is described in quantity, qual-
ity, location, and time dimensions.
b. The rules of the contingent market, such as pay-
ment vehicles, are described.
This institutional setting is clearly similar to that in the public good
provision experiments described above.
Accepting the notion that institutions do matter, Smith's para-
digm provides a framework in which to evaluate the effects of institu-
tions within economic systems or markets. He demonstrates that we
can compare behavior as institutions vary by investigating the effects
of the components of the institutions the messages players are per-
mitted to exchange, the allocation rules of the markets, and the rules
for determining payoffs. Economic theory tells us something about
which of these may be varied (and by how much) without significantly
altering the allocative results. Where the theory is silent, we must rely
on empirical work.43 In the final analysis, it is an empirical question
whether the results differ.
Empirical evidence exists suggesting that, as one walks along
a "gradient" of institutions, consistent results are obtained. One such
study by Brookshire and Coursey, where they compare the results of a
42. See, e.g., R.Prince et al., Improving the Contingent Valuation Method: Implementing
Contribution Game Behavior, 23J. Envt. Econ. & Mgmt. 78 (1992); M. Bagnoli et al., Voluntary
Provision of Public Goods: the multiple unit case, 47 J. Pub. Econ. 85 (1992).
43. Thus questions as to whether the subjects perceive their initial endowment as a
loan, the importance of the veto power, whether the cost information is presented are
all testable hypotheses in the context of the institution.
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laboratory Smith Auction, a field Smith Auction, and a set of contin-
gent valuation results.44
When making inferences concerning behavior in the field based
on observations from the laboratory, one must address questions of
"parallelism" or "external validity". Parallelism is satisfied when the
experimental design places the subjects in a decision setting that mim-
ics that faced in the field.45 Economic decisions are made in the con-
text of institutions. Parallelism requires that the institutional
characteristics of the laboratory capture the essential features of the
field setting being studied. For example, if the field setting involves
risk then the level of risk in the laboratory should be similar to that in
the field. If collective decisions are encountered in the field then these
should be present in the laboratory economy also. When the parallelism
condition is met the results of the laboratory may be generalized to the
field.46
The institutional feature that C&H wish to use to reject the use
of CVM to obtain values is the notion that CVM survey respondents
lack a "real economic commitment". Absent a theory of decision costs
in decision making, this argument falls victim to the same criticism
that may be made of Harrison's earlier work on payoff dominance.47
That is, the argument must be based solely on heuristic arguments that
the available rewards are insufficient to induce agents to select opti-
mal behavior. Individuals are not rewarded for good decisions nor
punished for bad decisions. Does this imply that individuals have no
incentive to think about and state their preferences?
44. See supra note 40 (modified Smith auction). C & H reject the results of Brookshire
& Coursey's 'trees' study on the grounds that some of the groups filed to reach unanimity
within the available time period. Note that the closure properties of the Smith auction
that is unanimity, are extremely stringent. Individuals time period. Note that the closure
properties of the Smith auction that is unanimity are extremely stringent. Individuals
who wish to extract the last increment of surplus may hinder the group. As is common
in much of experimental methodology the authors elected to end the session when the
subjects were 'close' to agreement. The subjects were unaware of the ending point of the
experiment if unanimity was not achieved and would therefore choose strategies on the
equilibrium path. C & H argue that these "out of equilibrium" bids convey no information
but this rejects the notions of general equilibrium and the Walrasian atonement process.
Markets converge to an equilibrium as agents send signals agents via their bids. Agents
have no incentive to send misleading bids since this will slow the convergence of the
market toward equilibrium and reduce the payoffs to the agent. Thus, the final bids
recorded by B & C cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. C & H's replacement of these bids
by zeros is incorrect, thus their conclusions are misleading.
45. See C. Plott, Dimensions of Parallelism: Some Policy Applications of Experimental Methods,
in Laboratory Experimentation in Econ.: Six Points Of View 193 (A. Roth ed., 1987).
46. See D. Grether & C. Plott, The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets:
An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case, 22 Econ. Inquiry 479 (1984).
47. G. Harrison, Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 749
(1989). Several experimentalists have taken issue with Harrison's arguments. See, e.g.,
A. Merlo & A. Schotter, Experimentation and Learning in Laboratory Experiments: Harrison's
Criticism Revisited, Am. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 1994); Smith & Walker, supra note 28.
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This is an empirical question. Smith and Walker,48 for example,
demonstrated that decision costs matter when the task is complex. 49
Dickie, Fisher, and Gerking reported observations of similar demand
behavior for hypothetical sales of strawberries and for actual sales.50
Brookshire and Coursey5 l conducted a study to compare the values
that individuals report for a given public good (in this case additional
trees in a park) under two different elicitation mechanisms. They re-
ported the results of a comparison between CVM and a version of a
Smith auction.5 2 They found that the results are statistically identical
as demonstrated by the coefficient on the institutional dummy being
statistically equal to zero. Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze examined
parallelism between demand behavior from the sale of a private good
in an actual setting and in a laboratory setting.53 Prince, McKee, Ben-
David, and Bagnoli required subjects to enter hypothetical bids and ac-
tual bids.54 The bidding behavior was identical in the hypothetical
setting and in the setting which required cash payments to be made.
Similar arguments may be made in the context of indirect esti-
mation methods. A frequently applied indirect method is the hedonic
price method (HPM).55 The value that individuals place on a nonmarket
good is derived from the price of a complementary market good. Con-
sider, for example, two houses identical in all respects except that one
is in an area in which the ambient air quality is better. If people value
good air quality, this will be reflected in a higher price for the house
located in the area of higher air quality. The observed price differen-
tial will be the WTP for higher ambient air quality. In practice, how-
ever, houses differ in several characteristics and an accurate estimate
of the WTP for air quality will require some sophisticated economet-
ric investigations using data from hundreds of home sales in a given
metropolitan area.
The housing market is particularly'useful for the estimation of
hedonic values. First, the housing market itself is well developed since
a sizeable fraction of the housing stock is traded in a given year. Sec-
ond, housing is location-specific, allowing the identification of specific
48. Smith & Walker, supra note 26.
49. See also E. Beckett et al., Incentive Compatibility of the BDM: The Roles of Cognitive
Transparency and Payoff Dominance (1991) (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO); J. Irwin et al., supra note 28.
50. M. Dickie et al., Market Transactions and Hypothetical Demand Data: A Comparative
study, 82 J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 69 (1987).
51. See supra note 40.
52. The Smith auction involved the respondents spending real dollars according to
their stated WTP. Hence this money was actually collected from the individuals.
53. D. Brookshire et al., The External Validity of Experimental Economics Techniques: An
Analysis of Demand Behavior, 25 Econ. Inquiry 239 (1987).
54. See Prince et al., supra note 42.
55. D. Brookshire et al., Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of the Survey and Hedonic
Approaches, 72 Am. Econ. 165 (1982).
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amenities such as air quality. Third, the housing market has several in-
stitutional features which ensure that trades take place at efficient
prices. Furthermore, because real estate agents are adept at market mak-
ing and financial institutions extend housing loans on the basis of ex-
pected resale values, location factors are fully incorporated into prices.
It is interesting to note that in the Brookshire et al. study of the
hedonic price effects of air quality in Los Angeles, the values obtained
via CVM are below those obtained from HPM as predicted by the the-
ory.s6 This suggests that CVM is capable of providing consistent esti-
mates of the values produced by HPM.
WELL DEVELOPED MARKETS-A STANDARD OF
COMPARISON?
A. Introduction
In their critique of CVM, C&H implicitly hold CVM to the stan-
dard of market-determined prices. We noted earlier that the courts often
place values on nonmarket goods, and that the techniques used for
valuing these are similar to those used for environmental goods. This
alone suggests that courts are willing to abandon the market standard
when necessary. However, we wish to pursue this issue because we
maintain that the "market standard" advanced by C&H is an artifact
of a particular class of markets that economists use for illustration only.
In fact, most market prices suffer from the same sorts of statistical fea-
tures that C&H ascribe to CVM values. For a given good there is typ-
ically a range of market prices, and the distribution of these prices is
not necessarily normal. In fact, only in perfectly competitive markets
that are in long-run equilibrium do prices converge to the single equi-
librium price that is depicted in textbook models.
B. Theoretical Foundations of CVM
We now turn to the theoretical foundations of CVM. Whether
CVM does or does not satisfy the "assumptions" of neo-classical eco-
nomics is a testable hypothesis. Recent work suggests that individual
behavior often violates the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory. Expected utility theory, in particular, is a poor predictor
of individual behavior for some persons, even when the sums of money
at stake are very large.57 However, markets force convergence across
individual behavior with the result that the market behaves according
56. See D. Brookshire et al., A Test of the Expected Utility Model: Evidence from Earthquake
Risks, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 369 (1985).
57. See supra note 27.
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to the theoretical predictions.m Thus, the market produces something
different from a simple aggregation of individual choices. It is the in-
teraction of the supply and demand sides of the market that provide
the apparent precision in market recorded prices. These prices are not
simple WTP values for the individual consumers in the market.
We reiterate our earlier proposition that the decision-making
underling economic theory is behavioral, and contextual. Institutions
affect economic decisions and comparisons across institutions are rel-
evant.,59 Our contention is that a theoretical challenge of CVM must
be set forth in a testable hypotheses framework and the debate should
be centered on accuracy and other empirical issues.
C. Contingent Markets Versus Hypothetical Markets
As originally conceived, 60 a CVM survey instrument is designed
to create in the minds of the respondents a contingent market for the
provision of a public good. Contingent markets form an essential func-
tion in economic analysis and in the workings of the economy itself.
The world is characterized by many potential states of nature, only one
of which may be realized. It is essential that economic agents be able
to write contracts which specify the allocation of resources over all pos-
sible states of nature.61 In their simplest form, insurance contracts are
such instruments. In order to purchase insurance, an individual must
undertake the same sorts of calculations that are required in respond-
ing to a CVM survey. That is, one must evaluate a potential loss con-
tingent on a fire or other disaster and decide whether the price of this
contingent contract is below one's WTP. While the premium paid is not
hypothetical, the remainder of the contract is effectively hypothetical
since the payoff on the contract will only take place contingent on the
fire or the disaster. For this market to function it requires that indi-
viduals undertake the same task as required of a respondent to a CVM
survey.62
58. Both the Brookshire study, see Brookshire et al., supra note 56, and a study by
Colin Camerer, see C. Camerer, Do Markets Correct Biases in Probability Judgment? Evidence
from Market Experiments, 2 Advances In Behavioral Economics 126-172 (J. Kagel & L.
Green eds., 1990), support the position that markets perform a significant convergence
function regarding individual behavior.
59. We had hoped not to use the word 'truth' in this paper. We would suggest that
there is no truth, but only concerns of accuracy.
60. R. Bishop et al., Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation: Results from a Simulated
Market, 23 Nat. Res. J. 619 (1983) describe CVM as the use of surveys and/or interviews
"to ask people about the values they would place on non-market commodities if markets
did exist. That is, subjects are asked about their willingness to pay or compensation
demanded, contingent on the creation of a market...." Id. at 619 n.1.
61. See K. Arrow & F. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis (1971), for a comprehensive
analysis of the role of contingent claims contracts in facilitating economic equilibrium
under uncertainty.
62. See D. Brookshire & T. Crocker, The Advantages of Contingent Valuation Methods
for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 36 Pub. Choice 235 (1981).
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All financial instruments are contingent contracts. Further, all
contracts which are not spot transactions involve uncertainty and are
resolved through contingent contracting. The central issue is not hy-
pothetical markets but contingent markets. Therefore, what should be
debated is whether real economic commitment is a significant factor
for the accuracy of CVM results since this is the difference between a
CVM setting and these other contingent contracts.
D. Relevance of CVM Distributions
Economists accept that well-developed markets provide good
information concerning prices. A particularly robust market institu-
tion is the oral double auction market such as that used for securities
trading on the New York Stock Exchange. The structure of this market
provides a great deal of information concerning "bids" and "asks" to
the traders in the market, which contributes greatly to convergence to
an equilibrium price. However, when we review the results of labora-
tory double auction markets, we observe many trades taking place at
prices other than the equilibrium price. Does this imply that markets
provide unreliable information regarding preferences? Clearly this is
not the case. None of the trades at non-equilibrium prices result in a
loss to the traders.63 Even with the "real economic commitment" in-
herent in this market setting we still observe variance in the prices at
which trades take place.
Thus, one cannot reasonably assert that the frequency distrib-
ution of the bids obtained from CVM surveys provides evidence that
a large variance observed in CVM bids is proof that the method yields
inaccurate values. Indeed, no inference can be obtained concerning the
accuracy of a preference elicitation technique from studying the dis-
tribution of bids unless we assume, a priori, that everyone assigns the
same value to the good. Researchers have investigated a myriad of mea-
sures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) and of the higher-
order moments (variance, skew, and kurtosis) of the distributions of
the values obtained from survey respondents. There is no a priori rea-
son to expect the distribution of willingness to pay along a market de-
mand schedule to have a normal distribution with a small variance.
The consumers' valuations may be clustered at any point along this
demand curve, not necessarily at the market clearing price.
It follows that the observation of a large variance in reported
WTP values by CVM respondents is not a sufficient condition to reject
the use of CVM to obtain values for nonmarket goods. In any market,
the range of the distribution of individual values is likely to be large.
63. It is interesting to note that there is generally greater price volatility for securities
on the NYSE within a given day than across average daily prices within a month.
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If the individuals in a market for a public good were asked to state the
values they assign to the good, we would obtain a range of values that
reflect the individual differences in the vertical heights of their demand
curves.
Therefore, markets simply tell us a great deal about equilib-
rium prices - the price at which the marginal trades take place. They
tell us much less about inframarginal prices, because we rarely observe
these prices. The apparent precision of market prices is due to inter-
action between the supply and demand. That is, observing a price for
unleaded gasoline of $1.15 per gallon does not necessarily mean that
no individual would be willing to pay $2.50 for a gallon.
CVM is designed to elicit valuations which should be expected
to be different across individuals. The courts are accustomed to deal-
ing with variances in damages suffered for like accidents. For exam-
ple, in the classic "eggshell skull" problem,64 the courts have evolved
the principle that the tortfeasor take the victim as originally found. As
Richard Posner notes-"the principle that the tortfeasor is fully liable
for his victim's damages even if the extent of those damages is un-
foreseeable is well established in tort law."65 That is, the same tort ac-
tion may result in much different damages being awarded depending
on the circumstances of the particular victim. The courts do not refuse
to award damages simply because there is considerable variance across
victims or because there is considerable agreement among experts as
to how to best compensate the loss.
Market outcomes cannot serve as an absolute standard of com-
parison. There are many different market structures, and these will gen-
erate different types of market conduct, for example, pricing behavior.
Only in perfectly competitive markets66 do market prices fully reflect
real resource costs. As soon as we drop the assumptions of perfect com-
petition this correspondence disappears. In particular, many markets
are characterized by the presence of a range of prices for objectively
identical products. Anyone shopping for a personal computer is aware
of this. Gasoline prices are more similar, since stations now post prices,
but there is still some variations within the same city. Therefore, the
competitive market cannot be an absolute standard against which to
gauge the performance of nonmarket value elicitation methods.
64. This is a setting in which an injured party suffers extraordinary harm due to a
condition that is unobservable by the party causing harm.
65. See R. Posner, Tort Law: Cases and Economic Analysis 26 (1982).
66. A standard sometimes incorrectly applied as the only valid economic paradigm.
Cummings, see Cummings, supra note 10, argues that the courts often fall victim to bad
economics. The issue is not economics but the application of bad economics and therein
lies the dissolution of Cummings' parable.
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DECISIONMAKING AND THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
Consider a court facing the task of awarding compensable dam-
ages to an individual for losses suffered due to an environmental ac-
cident. C&H's general theme is that the values obtained from CVM
and indirect method studies (such as HPM) are sufficiently inaccurate
as to be deemed unacceptable in determining compensable damages.
We have argued to the contrary regarding the evidence to date con-
cerning the accuracy of these studies. Further, an essential element of
tort law is the awarding of compensable damages. The courts must
make some determination of the damages. In general, a court may
refuse to award damages if they are too speculative. But here, Con-
gress has ordered the court to calculate the damages by the best avail-
able methods. Therefore, the court is justified in using CVM because,
although not perfect, it is the "best available" method.
Absent information concerning the losses, the courts would be
forced to assign a value of zero. Not using the available information
(the values estimated via CVM) implies that the courts will possibly
not assign penalties at all. This outcome defeats the purpose of award-
ing damages and the intent of Congress: unless the penalty approxi-
mates the loss, the tortfeasor will not take cost-justified mitigation or
avoidance. If we argue that we have no acceptable method to estimate
damages, then we are effectively arguing that the damages must go
uncompensated. 67 The consequences of adopting this position is that
tortfeasors will not have an incentive to take appropriate care and we
will have socially inefficient levels of environmental damage.
We have argued that CVM elicited values provide meaningful
estimates. Therefore, use of the information is justified if the losses
avoided by such use the information exceed those from not using the
information. Under this rule, those who wish to reject the use of CVM-
obtained values must demonstrate that the information has no merit.68
The above comparison involves the weighing of two types of
errors: overvaluing and undervaluing losses. Such problems are regu-
larly encountered in statistics when dealing with Type I and Type II
errors. If we begin with no information, the best we can do is assign a
uniform distribution to our estimate of the value of the environmen-
tal damages. The information from a CVM study (or other nonmarket
valuation study) allows us to update this prior distribution by employing
67. One could always resort to delphic methods-or rely on expert opinion. We do
not consider here the issue of whether lack of certainty in calculating damages means
damages should go uncompensated but the issue does raise another intriguing issue:
who should bear the risk of uncertainty in estimating damages.
68. It is interesting to note that under uncertainty, decision rules incorporate the
variance of the distribution of the data if the decision maker is not risk neutral. Otherwise,
decisions are based on the expected value of the payoffs. Is there any reason to believe
the parties causing harm are not risk neutral?
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Bayes' Rule to obtain a posterior distribution. This distribution will
have a smaller variance than the original distribution and therefore a
more precise measure of central tendency. This improves the decision
process. 69
To argue against the use of CVM data is to adopt the position
embodied by those who accepted the policy implications of the theory
of second best: absent perfect information concerning the magnitude of
the cross-partials, the optimal policy response is to do nothing.70 Con-
ventional wisdom aside, this is too extreme in our view. While perfect
information is rarely available, we typically have some information;
and it is an anathema to economics that such information has no value.
This is the point raised by Yew Kwang Ng, 71 who demonstrated that
the null policy response implied by the theory of second best would
be inferior to doing something when the policy maker has some infor-
mation.
Absent compelling theoretical arguments to the contrary, the
burden is to demonstrate that the information provided by CVM has
absolutely no value. Further, the errors resulting from the assignment
of compensable damages must be demonstrated to cost society more
than the errors of letting those that are responsible be irresponsible. We
suggest that a large body of literature demonstrates that CVM provides
meaningful results.
CONCLUSIONS
There are two grounds from which one may criticize a valua-
tion technique: the theoretical basis is flawed or non-existent, and that
the empirical estimates lack the necessary robustness for their intended
purpose.
Critics of CVM base their critique on appeals to a perceived
conventional wisdom, questions concerning the relevance of compa-
rable institutions, and a close examination of existing studies. How-
ever, although CVM is not above concern, research suggests that the
values obtained via CVM reasonably reflect actual resource costs. There-
fore, the glass is half full because valuable information is available for
the awarding of compensable damages. As such, the appropriate reac-
tion to concerns regarding CVM- elicited values is additional research
involving both field and laboratory investigations.
69. The larger the variance the more likely we are to commit Type I errors, incorrectly
rejecting a null hypothesis concerning the value of the environmental damages.
70, R. Lipsey & K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud.
11 (1956-58) are generally credited with the development of the formal representation
of the theory of second best.
71. Y. Kwang-Ng, Welfare Economics: Introduction and Development of Basic Concepts
(1979) presents this argument in considerable detail.
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We find no theoretical or philosophical arguments that estab-
lish that the CVM lacks a theoretical basis, except for appeals to a need
for a "theory of hypothetical behavior". This is an inappropriate ap-
peal, since CVM is anchored in a theory of contingent claims markets,
and the roots of this approach may be found in accepted theory. On
these bases, we argue that CVM derives from the same theoretical foun-
dations as neoclassical value theory.
Similarly, we have no empirical basis to reject the use of CVM
for compensable damages. We find that where comparisons with other
measurement techniques exist, CVM yields sufficiently robust infor-
mation to warrant its use in a court setting.
